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in the EU Emission Trading System 
Markus Åhman, Dallas Burtraw, Joseph Kruger, and Lars Zetterberg 
Abstract 
In its guidance on National Allocation Plans (NAPs), the European Commission has 
discouraged Member States from adopting allocation methodologies that would provide 
incentives to firms affecting their compliance behavior. The purpose is to promote economic 
efficiency and to prevent strategic behavior that deviates from individual and collective cost-
minimization. For example, some methodologies would reward one type of compliance 
investment over another. To discourage such actions, the EU Emission Trading System guidelines 
prohibit ex post redistribution of emission allowances within an allocation period based on 
behavior in that period. Similarly, the Commission has indicated that decisions about the initial 
distribution of allowances in the second phase (2008-2012) must depend on measures prior to 
2005 so as not to give companies an incentive to adjust their behavior to receive a larger 
allowance allocation. However, two other aspects of the NAPs—the treatment of closures and 
new entrants—may also affect firm behavior. An undercurrent in these guidelines is the question 
of whether Member States should allow incumbent emitters to hold infinitely lived, once-and-for-
all property rights to a share of the emission allowances in the future.  
This paper develops an approach for balancing efficiency considerations with perceived 
issues of fairness. We propose a ten-year rule to guide policy regarding closure of existing 
sources and the status of new sources and to guide the initial distribution of emission allowances 
in general. A ten-year rule would address issues of fairness and capture an important part of the 
potential gains that could be achieved through an efficient initial distribution of allowances. 
 
Key Words:  emission trading, allowance allocations, closures, new entrants, tradable 
permits, air pollution, cost-effectiveness, greenhouse gases, climate 
change, global warming, carbon dioxide 





1. Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 
2. The “Historic” Dilemma..................................................................................................... 4 
3. Closures................................................................................................................................ 7 
Treatment of Closures in the EU ETS.............................................................................. 11 
Summary: Treatment of Closures..................................................................................... 12 
4. New Entrants..................................................................................................................... 12 
Treatment of New Entrants in the EU ETS ...................................................................... 16 
Summary: Treatment of New Entrants............................................................................. 17 
5. The Need for Harmonization among Member States.................................................... 18 
6. Advice on Closures and New Entrants............................................................................ 20 
7. A Framework for Looking Forward............................................................................... 21 
The Ten-Year Rule ........................................................................................................... 22 
Free Allowances Forever? ................................................................................................ 23 
8. Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 24 
References.............................................................................................................................. 27 
Tables and Figures................................................................................................................ 30 
  
 The Ten-Year Rule: 
Allocation of Emission Allowances  
in the EU Emission Trading System 
Markus Åhman, Dallas Burtraw, Joseph Kruger, and Lars Zetterberg∗ 
1. Introduction 
In January 2005 the world’s largest emission trading scheme took flight as the European 
Union emission trading system (EU ETS). It directly involves 25 countries, covers 
approximately 45% of the emissions of carbon dioxide in the EU and includes five of the most 
energy intensive sectors: iron and steel, mineral, pulp and paper, refineries, and energy. The  
EU ETS is divided in five-year trading periods, with an initial three-year trial period from  
2005-2007.  
One of the most important and contentious issues in the design of an emission-trading 
program is how to initially distribute the emission allowances. At play is the creation and transfer 
of wealth in the form of a tradable property right to emit carbon dioxide (CO2). These already 
have an annual value of approximately € 38 billion (1.88 billion tons of CO2 annually at a current 
price just over € 20), which can be expected to grow substantially in coming years. Moreover, 
the way in which the emission allowances are distributed initially provides incentives that affect 
economic behavior, which has important consequences for the costs of reaching emission targets 
and for perceived fairness and stability of the trading program. 
Annex III of the EU Directive, which lays out the rules of the trading scheme (European 
Union 2004), presents criteria for the allocation of allowances. For example, a central feature of 
the EU guidelines is that ex post adjustments of allocations are disallowed. That is, regulators 
must decide prior to each trading period how many allowances will be allocated and to what 
installations, and the regulator cannot redistribute these allowances within the trading period. 
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Hence, an approach that updates the allocation based on some measure or behavior within the 
same trading period is precluded. In addition, the EU rules specify that in the first period (2005-
2007) only a small percentage of allowances may be auctioned, and at least 95 % of allowances 
should be allocated for free. In the second period (2008-2012) the amount to be given away for 
free has to be at least 90%. 
Still, considerable freedom is left to the individual Member States to decide the 
magnitude of allowances to be allocated and how allowances should be distributed among 
participants in the trading scheme. Ultimately, each Member State develops its own National 
Allocation Plan (NAP)1, which must be approved by the EU Commission ahead of each trading 
period.  
There is currently a process of reviewing the allocation process following the first set of 
NAPs. The EU Commission will publish the results of this review in a report by June 2006. 
However, Member States to the EU Commission must submit the second set of NAPs that same 
month. Revised guidelines from the EU Commission for the design of the second set of NAPs 
are expected to be available by the end of 2005 (Moser, 2005).  
A full discussion of the lessons from the first round of NAPs is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, clearly two of the most important issues are how to address installations2 that 
close (closures) and how to treat new installations that enter the trading system (new entrants3). 
Both of these issues are connected to the short-run question of ex post adjustments to allocation 
within a period. They also relate directly to the overarching issue of how emission allocations are 
to change between periods. For instance, if an installation closes but continues to receive an 
allocation within a period, shall that allocation continue into the next period? And if a new 
installation begins operation, does it have access to a pool of free allowances? Further, how the 
transition from the status as “new entrant” into “existing installation” should take place is not 
clarified in the EU Directive. These questions ultimately lead one to ask whether free allocations 
                                                 
1 All National Allocation Plans, as well as EU Commission decisions on them can be found at the official European 
Union website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm 
2 “Installation” is the term most commonly used in official EU documents. The technical definition is given in the 
EU directive on Emission Trading, article 3 (e) (European Union 2004), but in the context of this paper, the term can 
be regarded equivalent to “facility” or “plant.” 
3 Put simply, “new entrant” is an installation that starts its operations after the NAP has been submitted to the EU 
Commission. The technical definition is give in the EU directive on Emission Trading, article 3 (h) (European Union 
2004).  
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based on a historic measure from the beginning of the century are to survive indefinitely as 
climate policy evolves, or should that measure be updated over time? 4 
This paper analyzes how treatment of closures and new entrants should be handled in a 
cap and trade system, with a particular focus on the efficiency of the trading scheme and the 
inevitable connection to changing of allocation rules between trading periods. We first explore 
how the allocation of allowances based on historic data raises issues about whether the 
compensation inherent in an allowance allocation is appropriate for existing installations and, if 
so, at what level. We also consider whether this compensation should continue indefinitely. 
Next, we look at the related issues of treatment of closures and new entrants and examine the 
efficiency implications of different policies. We also report how EU Member States have 
addressed closure and new entrants in their NAPs, and we examine the efficiency and fairness 
implications of different policies across Europe.  
In the penultimate section we consider in which cases these decisions can be left up to 
Member States without placing efficiency goals at risk and in which cases the decision is better 
made in a uniform manner by the EU. In the final section we characterize a “ten-year rule,” 
which offers a way out of the dilemma of historic allocation and creates a framework to reconcile 
efficiency and fairness as the EU goes forward with its emissions trading system. 
In sum, we find that adjusting allocation upon closure of an installation will have a 
negative effect on efficiency. Yet the dominating policy in the EU Member States is to withdraw 
allocation or at least require transfer to another installation, in the event of closure. This, 
combined with the fact that firms are capital constrained, may justify free allocation to new 
entrants. However, there is a need to harmonize the rules on new entrants and closures. We 
propose that this should be done centrally in the EU. 
The ten-year rule describes an approach to updating the metric upon which allocation 
decisions are based when using a purely historic approach. The rule would replace an indefinite 
linkage to a frozen base year or period with a linkage that is gradually modernized. With a 
sufficient time lag—ten years—from current decisions to the updated allocation, incentives for 
current behavior would be affected slightly or not at all.  
                                                 
4 Here we make a distinction between issues associated with an updating base year and issues associated with the 
need to change allocations to reflect an increasingly stringent cap over time.  
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The ten-year rule captures the lion’s share of efficiency gains from a stable system of 
property rights. Yet it addresses the perception of fairness by providing a finite horizon for the 
potentially infinitely lived property rights that could be created under historic allocation and that 
have been created in previous systems. Finally, we also suggest that it may be even more 
desirable to have a second “ten-year rule,” which would provide for a gradual transition to an 
auction over ten years.  
2. The “Historic” Dilemma 
The limitation placed on use of an auction and the preclusion on adjusting allocations 
during the trading period has effectively forced Member States to allocate allowances for free to 
incumbent installations based on a historic measure of performance (often called 
“grandfathering”). In preparation for the second compliance period, the question will be 
reopened somewhat.5 It is unclear whether the allocation rules will continue to rely on the 
original historic performance criteria, or if the measures used for distribution could be updated 
based on performance during the first compliance period. However, the Commission has 
reportedly signaled its desire to continue to use base years for allocation that predate the first 
period of the EU ETS (Vis, 2005). 
As discussed later in the paper, a historic approach to the initial distribution of emission 
allowances has several disadvantages when compared with an auction approach (Cramton and 
Kerr, 2002). However, a historic approach also has two big advantages. First, free allocation may 
reduce resistance from industry to stringent targets. Experience with the U.S. SO2 program 
shows that the allocation of allowances at no cost to affected installations, has been critical in 
gaining political acceptance for the emissions trading concept (Stavins, 1998; Ellerman, 2005). 
Second, an economic justification for free distribution based on historic measures is to provide 
compensation to incumbent installations that are affected by the regulation (inter alia Tietenberg, 
2001; Harrison and Radov, 2002). However, numerous economic studies have found that free 
allocation of CO2 allowances typically overcompensates firms (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2001; 
Boemare and Quiron, 2001; Burtraw et al. 2002; House of Commons, 2005).6 With this in mind, 
                                                 
5 In the second period the limitation on the portion of allowances that can be auctioned is raised to 10%. 
6 The same does not apply necessarily to other pollutants. The finding depends on pollutant, sector, and market 
structure (Burtraw and Palmer, 2003). 
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the crucial question is: “How does the compensation that an installation actually receives from 
increases in revenue from the allocation of emission allowances coupled with changes in product 
prices compare to new costs?”  
Under a CO2 cap and trade program producers have two sources of potential new 
revenue. One source is the sale of emission allowances to other installations. This mechanism 
rewards low-emitting installations on average at the expense of higher-emitting installations, 
leaving all installations neutral in the aggregate. The second and more important source of new 
revenue is the increase in product prices that enables the pass-through of costs to consumers.  
On the other hand, producers experience an increase in marginal cost in two ways. One is 
the increased resource cost that is incurred for compliance with the emissions cap.7 In the 
aggregate we expect resource cost to be minimized with a cap and trade program. The second 
new cost is the regulatory cost embodied in using emission allowances.8 Even if awarded 
initially for free, the allowances have value because they could be sold to other installations. 
Hence they have an “opportunity cost” like other production costs (labor, fuel, materials).  
Whether allowances are given away for free or sold in an auction is not expected to affect 
marginal cost in a competitive market, since the value of an emission allowance in the market is 
not affected by how it is distributed initially. Hence, free distribution does not affect the firm’s 
revenues; but it does reduce total costs compared to purchase in an auction and thereby provides 
compensation to shareholders of the firm. 
Compared to previous emission trading programs, the market for CO2 is special because 
of the magnitude of the program and the size of the allowance market. For instance, under the 
U.S. sulfur dioxide (SO2) program the annual asset value of the federally created “intangible 
property right” embodied in SO2 emission allowances was comparable in magnitude to the 
annual cost of compliance. However, under a cap and trade program for CO2 in the EU striving 
to achieve initially, say, 5% reduction in emissions from baseline, the annual asset value of CO2 
allowances is roughly 40 times the size of the resource cost of compliance.  
                                                 
7 Resource costs refer to the increase in usual costs of operation including fuel, labor, and capital resulting from 
compliance strategies such as fuel switching and efficiency improvements. 
8 Regulatory costs refer to the opportunity cost of emission allowances used in electricity generation, that is, the 
market value of those allowances. 
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The relationship between the value of the allowance pool and the resource cost of 
compliance is illustrated in Figure 1, which provides a stylized example of an aggregate linear 
marginal cost schedule for reducing CO2 emissions. Across the horizontal axis is the percent of 
emission reduction to be achieved. The vertical axis is cost. This picture illustrates that the first 
unit of emission reduction is virtually free, the next unit costs a little more, and so on. At a 5% 
reduction in emissions the height of the marginal cost curve determines the value (P) of an 
emission allowance, because this represents the cost of achieving one more unit of reduction (or 
the savings from avoiding the last unit). The resource cost of reducing emissions up to a certain 
level is the sum of incremental costs, or as illustrated it is the triangle underneath the marginal 
cost schedule.  
At a 5% reduction in emissions, the industry must still use emission allowances sufficient 
to cover 95% of its original emissions. The asset value of emission allowances therefore is the 
rectangle indicated by price (P) multiplied by the quantity of emission allowances. Simple 
geometry indicates that with linear marginal cost the area of the regulatory cost rectangle is 38 
times the area of the resource cost triangle. Moreover, the magnitude of the allowance pool 
(regulatory cost) continues to increase relative to resource cost up to about 15% emission 
reduction. 
Most installations would not realize an increase in revenues equal to the full value of 
their resource (compliance) and regulatory (allowance) costs because changes in marginal cost 
rather than changes in total cost determine product prices. However, when emission allowances 
are distributed for free, whatever increase in revenue they realize for the use of emission 
allowances is revenue that can be applied directly as compensation for resource costs. Under free 
distribution of CO2 emission allowances, if the average installation is able to pass on to 
consumers only half of the value of allowances it uses then it would realize an increase in 
revenues that was dramatically greater than its increase in costs. 
The relative magnitude of the compensation compared to costs is just one part of the 
issue. The full dilemma emerges in considering allocation over many years into the future. If 
distribution based on historic measures continues over a long time horizon, the present 
discounted value of the stream of emission allowances is likely to overwhelm the economic 
value of an emitting installation. The award of a long-lived stream of emission allowances 
constitutes a massive transfer of wealth associated with the designation of property rights on the 
order of magnitude of the 19th-century land giveaway to railroads in North America. 
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Once launched, the inertia created by historic allocation is difficult to reverse. For 
instance, in the new rule finalized in 2005 governing SO2 emissions from power plants in the 
United States, known as the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), SO2 emission allowances will 
continue to be awarded decades into the future according to a formula based on heat input at 
incumbent installations operating between 1985-1987. 
In summary, the historic approach to the initial distribution of allowances is intended to 
compensate for sunk costs that lose economic value because of the regulation, but in the long run 
it is a historic dilemma. For investment decisions taken before current environmental regulation 
was announced, many would argue the authorities have a responsibility to attempt to provide 
compensation. However, even if one regards historic allocation as rightful compensation for sunk 
costs, the justification decreases as the undepreciated economic value of emitting installations 
decreases over time. The rate of depreciation varies by installation and typically ranges from 3% 
to 15% per year. A full analysis of the compensation criterion should consider the change in the 
asset value of affected installations, noting that the policy is likely to create winners and losers 
sometimes under the umbrella of a single firm.9 One can argue that a phaseout of historic 
allocation commensurate with an increase in the age of the installation would be a reasonable 
approach to satisfying the compensation criterion. Such reasoning figures prominently in finding 
a resolution to the two other issues that attend a historic approach to distribution that we address 
below—closures and new entrants—and in the proposed ten-year rule. 
3. Closures 
The basic idea of a market-based policy instrument is to favor the most efficient firms 
and installations and to stimulate abatement options that are least expensive. An emission trading 
system forces installations to recognize the economic cost of emissions that is embodied in the 
value of emission allowances. Installations with relatively lower environmental performance will 
face relatively greater costs associated with the use of tradable emission allowances, and should 
give way to installations with higher environmental performance.  
Providing the correct incentives for firm behavior is also the main argument to justify 
why the allocation is not changed if the installation reduces economic activity or even if it closes. 
If allocation is kept intact, the owner will consider the opportunity costs of continued 
                                                 
9 Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn (2005); Burtraw, Palmer, Bharvirkar, and Paul (2002). 
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operation—the marginal costs of operating, including the price of emission allowances—versus 
the relative opportunity cost of reducing emissions through efficiency investments when 
deciding whether to continue operation or not. If it is profitable for the operator to close an 
installation and sell the allowances to a more efficient plant, this will be the efficient solution and 
the intended effect of the trading scheme, everything else equal.  
A different policy that conditions the allocation of emission allowances on the continued 
economic operation of an installation has different incentive properties that may lead to different 
results.10 Instead of a one-time acquisition of tradable permits, the withdrawal of allocation based 
on an observed economic decision such as plant closure turns the allocation into a subsidy to 
production, because the firm earns the allocation if and only if it continues to operate the 
installation. In considering the marginal cost of operation, the firm will consider the allocation as 
a transfer that reduces the costs that it receives only if it continues to operate. Consequently the 
firm will not maximize its profits only with respect to the cost of production and market price of 
its products; instead, it will also take into account the value of the allowances that it will lose 
should it cease to produce output.  
The changed calculus for the firm has implications for the efficiency of the market. It will 
lead to an oversupply of output and reduced efficiency of the system. It will also lead to 
increased demand for allowances and consequently a higher price on allowances than what 
otherwise would have been the case.  
Indeed, there is an apparent paradox. If the allocation is unaffected by the decision of the 
firm, then the allocation is efficient in that it does not alter cost-minimizing behavior. By 
imposing a condition on the allocation—continued operation of the installation—the allocation 
transforms into a production subsidy that affects the opportunity cost of the firm’s production 
decisions.  
The effect of the subsidy is illustrated with characteristic industry data in Table 1.11 
Consider a firm facing a choice to select one of two existing electricity-generating installations 
                                                 
10 Stavins (2005) finds similar perverse incentive properties in vintage differentiated conventional regulations, such 
as the U.S. New Source Review Program. 
11 Table 1 presents generation-weighted estimates of technical and cost parameters aggregated over the population 
of installations in the United States. Estimates are the results of simulations using the Haiku electricity market model 
maintained by Resources for the Future, which has been used in a number of peer-reviewed studies and reports. 
Burtraw and Paul (2002) provide an introduction. All values are in 1999 dollars, converted to Euros at the rate of 
$1.23 = €1.00. 
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for continued operation, and the other installation is to be shut down. The choice between an 
existing pulverized coal installation and an existing natural gas combined cycle installation is 
illustrated in the first two data columns of Table 1. 
Each technology is expected to yield 2.85 million MWh of electricity generation per year. 
The going forward operating cost of the pulverized coal installation includes short run variable 
costs and fixed operation and maintenance charges that total €28 per MWh. The plant produces 
3.27 million tons of CO2, which at an allowance price of €18 per ton produce a regulatory cost 
(allowance burden) of €20 per MWh. The going forward total cost is €48 per MWh. In contrast, 
the existing natural gas combined cycle plant has a going forward total cost of €42. This measure 
is the resource cost of electricity generation including emission reductions and it is equal to 
social cost12. 
Imagine, however, that the emission allocation to an installation is withdrawn if an 
installation discontinues operation. For illustration we assume the allocation is exactly equal to 
anticipated emissions. In this case the decision to close the pulverized coal installation implies 
the loss of allowances worth €58 million per year, or €20 per MWh when levelized over the 
operation of the plant. Accounting for the opportunity cost of losing the allocation the adjusted 
going forward total cost is €28 per MWh. This is the private cost of operation as perceived by the 
facility, and it differs from the social cost. In other words, the value of this allocation is like a 
subsidy, which manifests itself when the installation passes on allowance costs to customers in 
the form of higher electricity prices and is deducted from the overall operating costs to get the 
new going forward cost. However, the value of allocation to the natural gas plant is only €10 per 
MWh. From the perspective of the firm, continued operation of the coal installation at €28 per 
MWh is the least cost option compared to the cost of the gas installation at €32, although the coal 
installation is not the least cost from a social perspective. The conclusion is that withdrawal of 
                                                 
12 Social cost is the total of all the costs associated with an economic activity. It includes both costs borne by the 
economic agent and also all costs borne by society at large. It includes the costs reflected in the organization's 
production function (private costs) and the costs external to the firm’s private costs, for instance damages caused by 
emissions of CO2. Thus the example is equal to social cost under the assumption that the allowance price is a correct 
reflection of marginal damages caused by the emission. 
 
9 Resources for the Future  Åhman, Burtraw, Kruger, and Zetterberg 
the emission allocation to existing installations alters their relative going forward costs and can 
affect retirement decisions.13 
Table 1 also presents two new investment options. One is a new natural gas combined 
cycle plant with going forward total cost of €46 per MWh, and a wind installation with cost of 
€41 per MWh. Each of these technologies has a going forward total cost that is lower than the 
cost of continued operation of the existing pulverized coal plant. However, if allocation to 
existing installations is removed upon closure, then the adjusted going forward total cost of the 
pulverized coal plant falls below the cost of the new, more efficient technologies. Withdrawal of 
the emission allocation affects not just the relative comparison of existing installations, but it 
also affects the comparison with new installations. Hence many observers (inter alia Betz et al, 
2004; Harrison and Radov, 2002; Tietenberg, 2001) have argued that in the interest of economic 
efficiency allocations should not be adjusted if an installation is closed. 
In addition to the efficiency argument, a second argument for keeping allocation if an 
installation is closed concerns the concept and certainty of property rights. The underlying idea 
of a trading scheme is that the least cost abatement options will be achieved through trading of 
emission allowances owned by the agents of the market. However, if the certainty of ownership 
of the allowances is reduced, the credibility of the nascent trading scheme may come into 
question.  
Nonetheless, there are arguments for withdrawing allocation to installations that no 
longer operate. Allocating a stream of allowances in perpetuity based on a historic measure may 
defy intuition about fairness and common sense. Permanent allocation is a difficult argument to 
make in the face of a question such as: “Why give allowances to somebody who doesn’t need 
them?” This is an especially potent argument if it appears an installation would have shut down 
“anyway” in the absence of the program, and the allowances are thereby deemed “anyway 
credits.” At the international level, similar criticisms have plagued the so-called “hot air  
credits” referring to emission budgets under the Kyoto Protocol for economies that have 
contracted since 1990. 
                                                 
13 An important assumption in this example is that the firm is able to pass through in electricity price 100% of its 
change in marginal cost. If the pass-through is less this then the value of the allocation subsidy to the firm is less 
than illustrated.  
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Furthermore, if allocation is removed, authorities have the control of those allowances 
and can either withhold them or allocate them to other installations. Should allocation not be 
removed but remain unchanged indefinitely, it is possible that at some point all allowances are 
allocated to non-operating installations. This is not necessarily detrimental to the efficiency of 
the trading scheme, but it means the possibilities for authorities to use allocation in order to drive 
changes in behavior, to compensate for losses, or to give rewards to desirable behavior are lost.  
Treatment of Closures in the EU ETS14 
Three options are applied in the EU ETS. By far the most common is that allocation is 
lost if an installation is closed. However, in a number of Member States the owner of a closed 
installation may transfer the allowances to a new installation instead of losing them altogether.  
A third option is to leave the allocation unaffected, but this has only limited application. 
In Germany an installation that is closed will receive no allowances the following year. 
Further issuance of allowances is labeled “a closure bonus” that must be avoided. Moreover, the 
German NAP also states that allocation to non-operating plants would “unnecessarily restrict the 
quantity of allowances available for use by other installations.” Closure is defined as when an 
installation emits less than 10% of its average annual baseline emissions. Further, if an 
installation emits less than 60 % of its average annual emissions the quantity of allowances will 
be reduced by the same proportion as the reduction in utilization of capacity compared to the 
reference period. Thus an installation has an incentive to keep operating and to emit a certain 
volume of CO2 compared to the reference period. If applied strictly, this punishes both 
adjustments in production and mitigation measures such as switching from coal to biomass. 
In Germany, any allowances recalled or not issued will be placed in the new entrant 
reserve. If the operator of the decommissioned installation commissions a new installation in 
Germany within three months, producing comparable products, the allocated annual allowances 
of the old installation can be transferred to the new installation. The three-month deadline may 
be extended up to two years under special circumstances. Similar transfer rules exist in Italy, 
Austria, and Poland. 
                                                 
14 All National Allocation Plans, as well as EU Commission decisions on them can be found and downloaded from 
the official European Union website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm. 
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In contrast, in Finland and Spain the transfer of allowances is not allowed. If an 
installation is closed, it will lose is greenhouse gas emissions permit and consequently lose 
subsequent allocations. 
Sweden and the Netherlands are the only Member States that apply the policy of letting 
operators keep the allocation in the case of closure. However, emission allowances are only 
allocated for one trading period at a time (Germany has introduced an exception to this, see 
below). That is, the operator of a closed installation may find himself without any allocation in 
the next trading period, should the regulators decide to update the allocation scheme in this way. 
Hence, in reality the difference between the policies of Sweden and the Netherlands and other 
Member States’ may be small.  
Finally, the above examples of how closures are treated in the EU ETS illustrate the point 
that “closure” is just an extreme form of output variation. Thus the distinction is vague between 
what is considered ex post adjustment or updating and thereby disallowed, and what is 
considered a legitimate withdrawal of allocation to closed installations under EU regulation. 
Summary: Treatment of Closures 
There is a strong case to be made against withdrawing allocations after closures of 
installations. Such a policy creates an inefficient subsidy for the continued operation of existing 
installations. It also may represent a burdensome intervention of government authorities into the 
market by unnecessarily changing the property rights associated with an allocation. At the same 
time, the understandable desire to treat participants in a trading scheme in a fair manner and to 
avoid awarding a perpetual property right to closed installations may argue for some limits to the 
indefinite allocation of allowances to closed installations. These fairness concerns seem to have 
dominated in most of the National Allocation Plans that we have analyzed, as most Member 
States have decided to withhold or require transfers of allowances from closed installations. In 
the next section, we will examine how the efficiency and fairness issues associated with closures 
interact with a related issue: the treatment of new entrants. 
4. New Entrants 
Many observers claim that the denial of free allowances to new sources discriminates 
against new sources. This is clearly true in the transfer of wealth, but is it relevant to economic 
behavior?  
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Under competitive conditions a one-time allocation to existing sources, even an 
allocation of an annual stream of allowances into the future, should not affect the variable costs 
or going forward cost of an installation. As long as the allocation is not affected by the decision 
to continue operation, there is symmetry in consideration of going forward costs between 
existing and new sources. This symmetry preserves the desirable efficiency properties of a 
market-based emission trading system. Hence, if the allocation to existing sources is not affected 
by the decision about whether or not to continue operation, one might conclude an allocation to 
new sources conditional on economic activity (entry) affects the going forward cost of that 
installation and undermines economic efficiency and fairness.  
Table 1 provides an illustration of how the allocation to new entrants can affect 
investment decisions. If the existing coal plant receives its allocation whether or not it continues 
to operate (a point we revisit in a moment) then its going forward total cost is €48 per MWh. 
Similarly, the existing natural gas plant has a going forward total cost of €42 per MWh. We 
assume the cost of a new natural gas combined cycle plant is €46 per MWh, and the cost of a 
wind plant is the least cost option at €41 per MWh. We will assume the allocation to new 
entrants is based on expected future emissions expressed as fuel specific benchmarks. The 
natural gas plant would receive an allocation worth €7 per MWh. The wind plant receives no 
allocation since its expected emissions are zero. In this case, the new natural gas plant has an 
adjusted going forward total cost of €39 per MWh, which is less than the existing coal or existing 
natural gas installation. However, note that the cost of the gas plant is also less than the new 
wind plant. From the perspective of the firm, the natural gas plant is the least cost option, 
although the wind plant is the least cost option from a social perspective. The example illustrates 
how the allocation to new entrants benchmarked to fuel-specific performance characteristic alters 
the firm’s investment decision. 
There are three significant caveats to this example. One is simply to recognize that if  
new sources were not to receive an allocation then eventually the industry would be populated by 
two classes of installations, some of which receiving an indefinite valuable wealth transfer and 
some not. This may not be sustainable in the long run, and at some point adjustments would need 
to be made.  
Second, as noted in section 3, most Member States in fact do adjust the allocation to 
existing installations that decide not to operate, so the symmetry between existing and new 
sources is already lost. As we have noted, the policies on closures and new entrants interact, 
enhancing the effects of the individual policies. Hence, the decision to withdraw emission 
allowances from an installation that closes alters the economic equation, placing incrementally 
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more advantage to keeping the installation in operation. Section 3 illustrated that if new 
installations do not receive an allocation, then they are indeed at an economic disadvantage in the 
context of marginal retirement and investment decisions. 
Given that most Member States do adjust the allocation to existing installations, we can 
ask: “Is an efficient set of incentives preserved if the allocation is removed from existing sources 
that close and allowances are simultaneously awarded to new installations?” If so, then there 
would be two efficient policy equilibria—one with no adjustments in the case of closures and 
new entrants, another with adjustments—and the EU would be faced with the relatively simple 
problem of coordinating the choice of equilibrium.  
We saw previously that an allocation to new sources that was benchmarked on a fuel-
specific basis would change the investment choice among new technologies. If all new 
technologies receive the same allocation it would preserve the ranking among new technologies, 
but the level at which the benchmarked allocation is set would determine the relative 
competitiveness of existing and new technologies. Drawing on the example in Table 1, let us 
assume that wind receives an allocation per MWh that has equivalent value to that for a new 
natural gas plant. The new natural gas installation would have an adjusted going forward total 
cost of €39 per MWh, and wind would have a cost of €41–€7 = €34 per MWh. Wind would 
remain the least cost option among new technologies, preserving an efficient decision when 
considering the new investment options. However, the existing coal plant remains the least cost 
option facing the firm overall, at €28 per MWh.  
This example shows that the relative ranking between new and existing installations is 
unaffected only if the value of withdrawals from installations that close and awards to new 
installations are equivalent. There needs to be a strong condition requiring that the adjustments 
for retirement and investment decisions have the same value per MWh of production in order not 
to undermine the efficiency of the ETS. Nonetheless it appears that an allocation to new sources 
remedies to a partial extent the imbalance between new and existing sources, although we see 
also that it can impose an imbalance among the new installations. One possible approach to solve 
the symmetry problem between new and existing installations would be to withdraw and award 
allocation based on common, fuel-neutral, benchmarks. 
Another possible approach that preserves symmetry as well as the interest of a Member 
State is to take away emission allowances unless the allowances are reallocated to a new 
installation operating within the same country. This approach leaves the allocation unaffected, as 
long as the owner executes a transfer upon closure of the original installation. As discussed 
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above this approach is applied, albeit in very different versions, under the “Transfer rule” in 
many Member States. 
This option could also be adjusted to condition allocation to the sale of “leftover 
allowances” to another installation in the same country. If there is a limited number of potential 
buyers, this approach may lead to a source of emission allowances for a new installation within 
the country that is somewhat below market rates. Most importantly, however, this approach 
raises difficult monitoring and administrative issues. For instance, is the purchaser of the 
allowances required to use them at specified installations? Intervention in market decisions at 
this level of detail would threaten to undermine the operation and raise cost of the ETS. 
A third caveat to the advice that economic efficiency is preserved if there are no 
adjustments to allocations for retirement and new investment. The reasoning heretofore assumes 
a simple interpretation of “competitive conditions” that may be too aggressive because a variety 
of factor markets, especially the capital market, have characteristics that complicate the analysis.  
Capital markets discriminate in the price they charge firms for acquiring new capital in 
response to observable accounting measures such as debt, liquidity, and cash flow and also due 
to uncertainties such as exposure to price volatility in factor inputs, including emission 
allowances. Hence, even a one-time allocation may have an indirect impact on the cost of an 
investment because the award of emission allowances may function as a subsidy of capital. 
Instead of having to go to the bank to borrow money to buy allowances, the investor has 
allowances available and a lower requirement to obtain capital. Since firms are capital 
constrained and their cost of capital varies with the accounting of revenues and costs on their 
balance sheet, the free allowances may lower the firm’s cost of capital and convey economic 
advantage to owners of incumbent installations relative to owners of new investment. Hence, 
even if allocation does not affect short-run variable cost it may in fact have an effect on going 
forward costs and investment. Put simply, money in the bank is a competitive advantage.  
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Treatment of New Entrants in the EU ETS15 
Treatment of new entrants is one of the areas where policies among the member states 
differ the most. Following is a discussion of some of the key differences for allocating to new 
entrants. 
The EU Commission only asks Member States to describe how new entrants can gain 
access to emission allowances. There are no rules on whether or not new entrants should be 
allocated free allowances. Still, all member states guarantee a certain volume of allowances will 
be available to new entrants at no cost, by creating a set-aside of allowances reserved specifically 
for new entrants. Allowances from these reserves are usually provided on a first-come, first-
served basis.16  
The most common allocation methodology is to base allocation on general emission 
rates, specified for a sector or a product type, and forecasted activity. However, benchmarks 
differ significantly across Member States, even for identical products such as heat or power. 
When sectorwide benchmarks cannot be defined, Member States often refer to Best 
Available Technology (BAT) as the benchmark to be used. The emission factors can be specific 
to an installation, or common for an entire sector. The latter is mainly used in the energy sectors, 
but for instance Italy also applies sectorwide benchmarks in the mineral and ceramic industries.  
The definition of BAT also varies across Member States. Some Member States refer to 
existing official EU studies (for instance the BAT reference documents or Joint Research Center, 
2005). Others refer to national legislation or to the IPPC directive (European Union, 1996), 
which allow BAT to be defined on a case-by-case basis. In Sweden, for example, BAT is to be 
defined “in accordance to environmental law,” on a case-by-case basis. For energy installations, 
only combined heat and power plants (CHP) are eligible for allocation from the new entrant 
reserve. A benchmark based on a fuel mix containing significant shares of renewables is used 
together with forecasts of generation in order to calculate the allocation. In contrast, Poland does 
not specify how BAT will be established. 
                                                 
15 All National Allocation Plans, as well as EU Commission decisions on them can be found and at the official 
European Union website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm. 
16 A limited number of Member States (e.g., Poland and Italy) also plan to purchase allowances from the market for 
new entrants if their new entrant reserves are oversubscribed.  
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Once benchmarks are selected, they are multiplied by a level of activity (e.g., output) to 
arrive at an allocation for sources. The most common method for estimating activity levels for 
new entrants is to use a forecast of future production. There are significant differences among 
Member States in how the forecasts are estimated and production calculated. In some cases (e.g., 
Sweden, Poland) allocation is based on production forecasts specific to the new installation. In 
other Member States (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Austria, and Italy) allocation is based on the 
size of the new installation, expressed as installed capacity, and general assumptions on 
utilization rates for specific technologies. However, even among these general methods, there are 
differences. For example, Finland and Denmark, whose energy systems to a large extent are 
integrated, use different utilization rates when calculating the allocation to new entrants. 
This construction creates a range of potential problems. Basing allocation on forecasts 
provides an incentive for firms to exaggerate forecasts of future production. Since ex post 
adjustments are not allowed in the EU ETS, the only possibility for regulators to police incorrect 
forecasts is to update the allocation between trading periods. However, as will be discussed later 
in the paper, this has the potential to distort operational decisions made by firms.  
Finally, there is at least one example of a Member State that explicitly guarantees an 
allocation to new entrants for a significant number of years. Germany guarantees free allowances 
to a new entrant for up to 14 years if it is a completely new installation. If the new installation is 
replacing an old installation and allowances are transferred from the old installation, allocation 
may be guaranteed for up to 18 years. It is not clear if this guarantee of property rights is 
compatible with the revision of the EU directive on the ETS that will take place in 2006 and 
most probably again in 2012, where significant changes in allocation methodology at the EU 
level might be mandated. 
Summary: Treatment of New Entrants  
Under perfect conditions, investment decisions should not be affected by whether free 
allocation is given to new entrants or not. However, as discussed above, there may be additional 
inequities (e.g., in the cost of capital) that arise by allocating to existing sources and not new 
sources. Furthermore, since Member States adjust allocation to closures, incumbent emitters are 
currently subsidized over new entrants. Moreover, at this early stage in the EU ETS, it may be 
difficult to convince Member States that there is adequate liquidity in the system to prevent 
barriers to entry for new firms. Given that all 25 Member States have set up provisions to give 
allowances to new sources, allocation to new entrants is clearly a political priority. Thus, we 
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propose allowing (but not requiring) new entrant reserves, but enforcing a standardized approach 
to allocation from these reserves. Standardized requirements on closures and new entrants would 
eliminate competitive distortions between Member States and help achieve more efficient 
investment and retirement decisions within Member States. 
5. The Need for Harmonization among Member States  
The preceding discussion has examined the issues associated with closures and new 
entrants within a single domestic system. However, as discussed, Member States currently have 
the autonomy to set their policies on new entrants and closures as they see fit. In fact, there has 
been considerable variation among these policies.  
Decisions about allocations, in particular those on closures and new entrants, involve 
considerations about national competitiveness. The government of a Member State may be faced 
with incentives that lead to a decision that is not the efficient solution for the trading program as 
a whole. The possibility that Member States could obtain a better outcome by individual action 
that undermines the outcome for the broader ETS constitutes the well-known “prisoner’s 
dilemma.” 
For instance, under the current system where each Member State may decide on the rules 
for closures, the efficient solution for the EU collectively may not be the most rational option 
from an individual Member State’s perspective. Since each Member State wishes to keep the  
tax base and the job opportunities that installations provide, it does not want to provide less 
incentive to keep an installation in operation in its own country than those that exist in other 
Member States. Thus it may seem rational from a Member State point of view to take allowances 
away from installations that close, or at least condition a retained allocation on a transfer to a 
new installation in the country, in order to create incentives for continued operation in one’s  
own country. Similarly, in the interest of attracting new investments that hopefully will result in 
a larger tax base and increasing job opportunities for its own citizens, it is rational from a 
Member State perspective to be generous to new entrants, regardless of the effect on the system 
as a whole.  
For a politician it is hard to introduce policies that would be more favorable to the closure 
of installations in one’s own country and make new investments less attractive than in 
neighboring Member States. Yet this is what is currently asked of the regulators in the EU 
Member States.  
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Consider the case of the energy sector regulations in two neighboring Member States 
connected by electricity transmission lines, for instance Denmark and Germany or Sweden and 
Finland. All these Member States apply benchmarking as a base for allocation to new entrants, 
but the emission factors used for the allocation differ significantly. This means allocation to a 
new entrant will be more favorable in one Member State than another, leading to new 
investments to occur in that Member State. 
Similarly, imagine two Member States that both withdraw allowances upon closure, but 
the formula imposes a greater penalty in one country than another. In this case the adjusted going 
forward total cost will be less in the country with the greater penalty. If a firm were otherwise 
indifferent between closure of installations in these two countries, it would choose to keep open 
the installation in the country with the greater closure penalty. The setting creates a contest 
between Member States to provide favorable incentives to retain and attract investment. The 
ultimate outcome may be economically inefficient and politically undesirable. 
Table 1 provides examples that give these scenarios meaning. For instance, imagine the 
proposed new wind installation, which has the lowest social cost, would be built in a Member 
State that does not offer allowances to entrants but the proposed new natural gas installation 
would be built in a Member State that does award allowances to entrants. The firm would choose 
the latter place for new investment. Indeed, the other Member State might have an incentive to 
initiate allocations to new entrants benchmarked to the level for a new natural gas installation.  
The above discussion raises a broader issue about when there should be EU-wide 
mandatory policies for harmonization of design elements in the EU ETS.17 Although a full 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, we suggest the following general rule. 
If a Member State decision affects the overall efficiency of the EU ETS, then a directive is useful 
because the paramount role for the Commission is to encourage efficiency in the trading system. 
This is a function that cannot be achieved without an EU-wide perspective.  
In other cases it may be that one design approach is as effective as another, and the issue 
is simply one of coordination. In this case, the most efficient outcome is achieved when the 
Commission ensures that all Member States use the same approach, whatever it is. For example, 
                                                 
17 Kruger and Pizer (2004) address the broader issue of whether the EU ETS strikes the right balance between 
harmonization and flexibility of design elements. 
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the design of registries is one such issue. Finally, when there is no efficiency issue, then 
whenever possible discretion should be preserved for the Member States.  
Applying this guidance, our conclusion is that the best solution would be to regulate the 
treatment of closures at the EU level. Thus, Member States should be required to let installations 
keep their allocation even in the event of closure. We believe that this is clearly an efficiency 
issue that justifies consistent treatment across Europe. The case for allocating to new entrants is 
somewhat less convincing. If existing installations are no longer penalized for shutting down, 
this removes the subsidy for continued operation of these sources, which negates the best 
justification for providing allowances to new sources.  
6. Advice on Closures and New Entrants  
For three reasons we do not offer advice to prohibit entirely the adjustments for closures 
and new entrants. One is that it is plain to see that Member States and affected constituencies are 
strongly interested in making such adjustments. There must exist political and policy 
considerations guiding this decision. Second, we identify some compelling reasons for 
adjustments. Fundamentally, it may be that competitive conditions do not apply in capital 
markets. Third and, perhaps more importantly, at stake is the assignment of assets of significant 
value and a fairness perspective critical of indefinite allocations holds great influence. Again, 
however, we suggest that if adjustments are made, an effort should be made to treat technologies 
in a symmetric way. 
We find that policies on closures and new entrants interact and have a bearing on 
retirement and investment decisions. The relative competitiveness of existing can only be 
preserved if the value of the withdrawal of the allocation is the same for all installations. Balance 
between existing installations and new entrants can be restored if new entrants receive an 
allocation, with a value equivalent to that of the withdrawal. However, given the contrasting 
motivations for making adjustments, a rule constraining adjustments in this way appears 
unrealistic. Hence, we conclude that any adjustment to allocations for closures and new entrants 
has an efficiency cost.  
As demonstrated, the issues connected to treatment of closures and new entrants are all 
part of the larger problem of how an allocation may be updated without reducing efficiency of 
the trading scheme. In the following section, we propose a framework that would integrate our 
recommendations on closures and new entrants with an overall policy on how allocations might 
change over time. 
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7. A Framework for Looking Forward 
The preceding discussion on closures and new entrants highlights a fundamental tension 
inherent in the free allocation of allowances. On one hand, there is the desire to avoid allocation 
methodologies that provide incentives or disincentives to business decisions. On the other  
hand, there is a need for equitable treatment of new and old sources. Although the trade-off is 
perhaps most explicit in the closure/new entrants issue, it also arises more generally in the 
question of whether allocations are indefinite property rights or whether they should change over 
some time period.  
In general, the economics literature finds that changing or updating allowance allocations 
over time may have a distorting effect on company decisions. For example Burtraw (2001) and 
Fisher (2001) found that updating output-based allocation methodologies serves as an 
economically inefficient subsidy for production that lowers product prices for consumers. 
Similarly, in an analysis of a potential emissions trading program in Alberta, Canada, Haites 
(2003) found that an output-based updating allocation provides an incentive for production.  
In the EU context, the European Commission has determined that updating of allocations 
is not allowed within each phase of the EU ETS. For example, the commission prohibited the use 
of ex post adjustment clauses in the national allocation plans of Germany, Austria, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Belgium (EC, 2004a, 2004b). The Commission noted that these 
provisions, which would allow authorities to confiscate allowances from companies if emissions 
were lower than predicted, “would create uncertainty for operators and be detrimental to 
investment decisions and the market” (EC, 2004b). 
The commission has noted that the base period for allocation in the second phase of the 
EU ETS should be no later than 2005 (Vis 2005). This view signals the Commission’s desire to 
avoid providing incentives that distort economic behavior to affect future allocations. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the initial base year must be kept forever and whether 
sources should continue to receive allowances in perpetuity based on that base year, as has been 
the case with the SO2 trading system in the United States. With a structure that requires new 
allocations for each new five-year phase, some sort of change in allocations is inevitable in the 
EU system. 
U.S. policymakers have also struggled with these issues as they have developed proposals 
for further reductions in the SO2 and NOx caps. For example, the model rule for the NOx SIP call, 
a program that requires regional summertime reductions in NOx in the eastern half of the United 
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States, presented a sample allocation methodology that updates allocations based on a rolling 
base period from four years before the year that allowances are allocated.  
The Ten-Year Rule 
A delayed updating approach, similar to that proposed in the NOx SIP call example 
described above, would be a way to minimize distortions in firm behavior caused by updating. It 
also would avoid allocating allowances to existing sources in perpetuity. However, unlike the 
SIP call methodology, we propose a ten-year rule whereby installations would receive allocation 
based on activities dating ten years back.  
Imagine a Member State that has chosen an emission-based allocation with the average of 
three reference years from 2000-2002. Until 2011, existing installations would receive 
allocations based on the average of 2000-2002, but in 2012 the allocation would be based on the 
average of 2001-2003, and so forth. If an installation reduced production or closed it would 
continue to receive allowances for ten years. 
New entrants would first be allocated based on projected output, but after ten years the 
allocation would be updated. For instance, an installation starting in operation in 2005 would 
receive allocation based on forecasts until 2014. From 2015 onwards allocation would be based 
on actual activity ten years previous. Figure 2 illustrates the concept of the ten-year rule 
schematically. 
The ten-year rule introduces updating, which has the disadvantage that it provides an 
inefficient price signals. However, the ten-year lag weakens significantly the tendency of 
updating to produce perverse incentives for actors on the market.  









⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
n , where r is the real rate of financial discounting. If the 
allocation decision in year n is based on behavior in year b, and if the discount rate is 10%, if the 
ten-year rule were in effect the lag would reduce the incentives provided by updating by 60%. 
This would diminish significantly the impact of updating on the behavior of firms. 
The ten-year rule would provide an automatic remedy to the conundrum of how to treat 
existing sources that reduce economic activity or close. Sources would continue to receive an 
annual allocation until they reached a point where they no longer had economic activity in an 
updated base period. In other words, if existing installation is shut down, it would continue to 
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receive allowances for ten years, thereby diminishing any perverse incentives to continue 
operation. However, eventually the group of installations receiving allowances would slowly 
shift, as sources that shutdown would eventually stop receiving allowances. 
Under the ten-year rule the treatment of new sources would have parallel incentives. 
Initially, new sources would receive allowances from a reserve according to emission rate 
benchmarks that might be standardized across industry sectors in Europe. Preferably, allocations 
for these installations would be based on installed capacity and standard utilization rates to avoid 
gaming and inconsistencies associated with case-by- case projections of expected utilization. 
New installations would continue to receive an allocation on this basis for ten years before 
allocations would begin to update based on a rolling base period similar that that of existing 
sources.  
Free Allowances Forever? 
The ten-year rule is designed to address the trade-offs between updating and permanent 
allocations. However, there is a separate set of issues raised about whether sources should 
receive all of their allowances for free for their entire operational life and beyond. Since the 
existing fleet of CO2 emitting installations is likely to be long-lived, the most significant 
characteristic of the ten-year rule is how it treats currently existing sources. 
There is considerable discussion in the economics literature about the advantages of 
auctions instead of free allocations of allowances. For example, Cramton and Kerr (2002) 
describe a number of equity benefits from the auctioning of allowances, including providing a 
source of revenue that could potentially address inequities brought about by a carbon policy, 
creation of an equal opportunity for new entrants in the allowance market, and avoiding the 
potential for “windfall profits” that might accrue to emissions sources if allowances are allocated 
at no charge. In general equilibrium analysis Goulder et al. (1999) and Dinan and Rogers (2002) 
find that recycling revenues from auctioned allowances would have dramatic economywide 
efficiency benefits if they were used to reduce preexisting taxes on labor or capital. In partial 
equilibrium analysis Burtraw et al. (2001) find benefits of comparable magnitude within the U.S. 
electricity sector that stem from the reduction in the difference between price and marginal cost 
were an auction used to distribute emission allowances. In the European setting, Böhringer and 
Lange (2004) argue that a transition to an auction is the only way to achieve efficiency in the 
apportionment of emission reductions among nations and between the trading system and outside 
the system. 
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The ten-year rule is an important step toward efficiency but an auction of allowances is 
the only approach that would address all of the concerns regarding general or partial equilibrium 
analyses. The gradual removal of a historic approach under the ten-year rule is consistent with 
the idea that allocations to incumbent installations should not be free and permanent, and hence 
the rule provides the foundation for another transition away from free allocation of emission 
allowances.  
Thus, in addition to the ten-year updating rule outlined above, there would be a useful 
role for a comparable rule for transitioning sources away from a 100% free allocation. For 
example, after ten years of free allocations, there might begin a transition period with a steadily 
increasing auction of allowances. Similar approaches have been featured in recent allowance 
allocation proposals in the United States. For example, the original version of the Bush 
Administration’s “Clear Skies” proposal for regulation of SO2 and NOx would have begun with 
free allocation and would have gradually increased the proportion of allowances auctioned over 
the course of 50 years until all allowances were auctioned. A recent proposal by the U.S. 
National Commission on Energy Policy for an economywide greenhouse gas trading program 
would begin with the auction of 5% of allowances for three years, and would then phase in an 
increase to 10% over the following ten years. A faster transition may be justified, but that is the 
subject of separate analysis.  
8. Conclusions 
The European Commission has discouraged Member States from adopting allocation 
methodologies that would provide incentives to firms affecting their compliance behavior. In 
general, these incentives have effects that move behavior away from economic efficiency and 
thereby raise the cost of the emission-trading program.  
In this paper we demonstrate that the negative effects of adjusting allocation become 
apparent when analyzing the treatment of new entrants and closures in the EU ETS. There is a 
strong case to be made against withdrawing allocations after closures of installations. 
Withdrawal of allowances will serve as a subsidy of production, resulting in negative effects on 
efficiency and higher allowance prices.  
However, we also observe that a purely historic approach to the initial distribution of 
allowances presents a political dilemma. There is an understandable desire to treat participants in 
a trading scheme in a manner that is perceived as fair. There are also reasons to avoid awarding a 
perpetual property right to closed installations. This argues for some limits to the indefinite 
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allocation of allowances to closed installations. These concerns seem to have been dominant in 
the decisionmaking in most of the National Allocation Plans that we have analyzed, as most 
Member States have decided to withhold or require transfers of allowances from closed 
installations. 
Similar considerations emerge in the consideration of new entrants. A strong argument 
can be made that in order to preserve economic efficiency new entrants should not receive an 
allocation because to do so lowers the going forward cost of new entrants and gives them an 
advantage relative to the going forward cost of incumbents.  
However, there are several reasons to award an allocation to new installations. If new 
installations do not receive an allocation then ultimately the economy will find itself populated 
with two classes of facilities, those original incumbents receiving an allocation and the entrants 
who do not. Moreover, since firms are often constrained by capital, and capital markets will 
anticipate a risk associated with the acquisition of allowances, there may be reason to provide a 
capital subsidy in order to promote new investment.  
Policies on closures and new entrants interact and have a bearing on retirement and 
investment decisions. The decision to withdraw emission allowances from an installation that 
closes incrementally adds to the advantage to keeping the installation in operation. Since 
Member States adjust allocation to closures, incumbent emitters are currently subsidized over 
new entrants. We conclude that free allocation to new entrants may be justified to some extent, 
but the regulation currently in place in the EU will have unnecessarily large detrimental effects 
on efficiency. 
In order to obtain a level playing field there is a need for symmetry in the regulation on 
closures and new entrants. The transfer rules for closures, used in many Member States, can be 
seen as an attempt to achieve symmetry between existing and new installations, although the 
policies fall short of avoiding negative effects on efficiency. A potentially better option to 
achieve symmetry would be to use fuel-neutral benchmarking, e.g. allocating—and withdrawing 
in the event of closure—a set number of allowances per unit output, regardless of technology. 
The suboptimal policies currently used for closures and new entrants emanate from the 
fact that the interests of the individual Member States are not perfectly aligned with those of the 
EU as a whole. We find that central regulation of treatment of closures and new entrants seems 
necessary in the EU.  
We propose a ten-year rule to guide a transition from the current set of existing policies 
to a level playing field for new entrants and closures. The rule would replace an indefinite 
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linkage to a frozen base year or period with a linkage that steadily modernized, but which 
preserved a sufficient time lag from current decisions (ten years) that incentives affecting current 
behavior would be affected slightly or not at all.  
The ten-year rule captures the lion’s share of efficiency gains from a stable system of 
property rights. Yet it also addresses the perception of fairness by providing a finite horizon for 
the potentially infinitely lived property rights that could be created under historic allocation and 
that have been created in previous systems. Moreover, we find that grandfathering (historic 
allocation) typically overcompensates installations for sunk costs. Further, the justification for 
compensation decreases as the undepreciated economic value of emitting installations decreases 
over time. Following the compensation rationale, allocation should thus decrease over time, 
which creates a need for transitioning away from grandfathering and to updating of the 
allocation. 
The overlapping rules governing allocation to different types of sources has the 
unfortunate property that it creates incentives that affect economic behavior. For this and a 
variety of other reasons, an auction approach has appeal. We close with the suggestion that it 
may be even more desirable to have a second “ten-year rule,” which would provide for a gradual 
transition to an auction over ten years. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Technologies and Costs 
  units  Existing Coal  Existing NGCC  New NGCC  New Wind 
Capacity  MW  500 500 500  1000 
Utilization  hours/year  5,694 5,694 5,694  2,847 
Generation  MWh/year  2,847,000 2,847,000 2,847,000  2,847,000 
Going Forward 
Operating Cost  €/MWh  28 32 39  41 
Emission rate  tons/MWh  1.15 0.54 0.42 0 
Emissions  tons/year  3,274,050 1,537,380 1,195,740  0 
Allowance 
Price  €/ton  18 18 18  18 
Allowance 





€/MWh  48  42  46  41 
Allocation  tons/year  3,274,050 1,537,380 1,195,740  0 
Value of 
Allocation  €/year  58,427,239 27,435,399 21,338,644  0 
Levelized 
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Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the ten-year rule. Allocation is based on activities with a ten-year time lag. 
Averaging over several years, or whether allocation is based on emissions, output or input will not alter the concept 
or change the functioning of the rule.  
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